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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Donald Turner, a.k.a. Don Wood, was convicted by a 
jury of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United 
States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  The District Court 
sentenced Turner to 60 months‟ imprisonment and three 
years of supervised release.  In addition, it ordered Turner 
to pay $408,043 in restitution to the Government under 18 
U.S.C. § 3663.  Turner appeals his conviction and 
sentence.  He asserts that the District Court erred in 
admitting (1) recorded conversations between his co-
conspirator and an undercover Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) agent and (2) foreign bank documents that the IRS 
seized from his co-conspirator‟s residence and office.  
Turner also argues that the District Court erred in requiring 
him to pay $408,043 in restitution because it did not make 
findings regarding his ability to pay.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we will affirm.   
 
I. 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
 Turner is the author of Tax Free! How the Super Rich 
Do It!—a book that instructed readers how to “escape 
federal and state income taxation” through the use of 
common law trust organizations (“colatos”).  (App.  384.)  
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He is also the former director of First American Research 
(“FAR”), a membership organization that he created to 
assist members in implementing the colato program 
described in his book.    
 
In 1991, Turner enlisted Daniel Leveto, the owner of 
a veterinary clinic, as a new FAR member, and Turner then 
assisted Leveto in implementing the colato program.  FAR 
created Center Company, a foreign colato, and appointed 
Leveto as the general manager and Turner as a consultant.  
Leveto then “sold” his clinic to Center Company, which in 
turn “hired” Leveto as the clinic‟s manager.   
 
After the sale, Leveto continued to control and 
operate the clinic just as he did when he was the owner.  
But because the clinic was no longer in his name, Leveto 
stopped reporting the clinic‟s income on his individual tax 
returns, and consequently paid no taxes on the clinic.  
Center Company, which was now responsible for reporting 
the clinic‟s income, also did not pay the clinic‟s taxes 
because it distributed the clinic‟s income to other foreign 
colatos, which according to Turner, “transformed” it to 
untaxable foreign source income.   Thus, no one paid the 
clinic‟s taxes. 
 
Although the clinic‟s taxes went unpaid, Leveto had 
full access to the clinic‟s income through various sources, 
including foreign and domestic bank accounts, nominee 
foreign and domestic bank accounts, commodity accounts, 
loans from the colatos, and debit and credit cards opened 
under the colatos‟ names.   
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In 1993, Leveto and Turner executed a written 
agreement for Leveto to market and sell Tax Free!.  Leveto 
purchased each book from Turner for $637.50 and agreed 
to sell the books for at least $1,275 each.  In 1995, the IRS 
began a criminal investigation into Leveto to determine 
whether Leveto‟s sale of his veterinary clinic was 
legitimate, and whether the colato program was valid.  As 
part of the investigation, Manuel Gonzalez, an undercover 
IRS agent, purchased Tax Free! from Leveto.  After 
Gonzalez purchased the book, he and Leveto spoke about 
the program several times both in person and on the phone.   
Leveto informed Gonzalez about the benefits of the colato 
program and encouraged him to attend a FAR membership 
meeting to better understand how the program worked.  
Several of these conversations were recorded and 
introduced as evidence at Turner‟s trial.   
 
In addition, Leveto submitted Gonzalez‟s name to 
Turner as a qualified FAR member, who, in response, sent 
Gonzalez a letter explaining the benefits of FAR and 
enclosing a membership application.  Turner also spoke 
with Gonzalez on the phone about the colato program and 
FAR membership.   
 
The investigation into Leveto‟s dealings with Turner 
also involved the search of Leveto‟s residence and office.  
IRS agents seized a large volume of documents and 
records from both locations, including from safes inside 
Leveto‟s office.  The documents included Leveto‟s foreign 
and domestic bank records, his handwritten notes that 
referenced FAR, colatos, and Tax Free!, correspondence 
with Turner, evidence relating to Leveto‟s nominee 
accounts, and correspondence with banks, including wire 
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transfer requests.  Many of these documents were 
introduced at Turner‟s trial.     
 
B. Procedural History 
 
In 2001, a federal grand jury charged Turner, Leveto, 
and Leveto‟s wife, Margaret Leveto, with conspiracy to 
defraud the IRS by concealing the Levetos‟ assets, and 
thus, preventing the IRS from computing and collecting the 
Levetos‟ federal income taxes in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371.  Before trial, Turner filed a motion in limine to 
exclude several pieces of evidence, including (1) the 
recorded conversations between Leveto and Gonzalez, and 
(2) the foreign bank records that the IRS seized from 
Leveto‟s office and residence.  Turner argued that both 
were inadmissible hearsay and that the Government failed 
to properly authenticate the foreign bank documents.  The 
District Court disagreed and held them to be admissible. 
 
The District Court admitted the recorded 
conversations under Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(E), which states that a statement is not hearsay if 
it is offered against an opposing party and “was made by 
the party‟s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.”  It concluded that there was an unindicted 
conspiracy between Leveto and Turner to impede or impair 
the IRS‟s tax collection efforts by recruiting members to 
FAR, which worked with members in concealing their 
income from the IRS, and that Leveto‟s statements to 
Gonzalez furthered that conspiracy.
1
  The District Court 
                                              
1
We note for context that in its response to Turner‟s 
motion in limine, the Government argued that the recorded 
 7 
 
held that the Government properly authenticated the 
foreign bank documents and admitted documents bearing 
Leveto‟s signature or handwriting under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).  It admitted the rest of the 
contested documents under the residual hearsay exception.   
 
The jury convicted Turner of conspiracy.  The 
District Court sentenced Turner to 60 months‟ 
imprisonment and three years of supervised release.  In 
addition, applying 18 U.S.C. § 3663, the District Court 
ordered Turner to pay $408,043 in restitution, the full 
amount of the Government‟s loss, without considering 
Turner‟s ability to pay.   
 
Turner now appeals.  He contends that the District 
Court erred in admitting the recorded conversations under 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because there was no evidence of a 
conspiracy to recruit members to FAR.  In addition, he 
contends that the District Court erred in admitting the 
foreign bank documents because (1) the Government did 
not properly authenticate the documents and (2) the 
documents admitted under the residual hearsay exception 
did not have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to 
                                                                                                 
conversations were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) 
and that there were two conspiracies that the statements 
were made in furtherance of: (1) the indicted conspiracy to 
conceal the Leveto‟s income from the IRS; and (2) the 
unindicted conspiracy to recruit members to FAR.  In 
admitting the recorded conversations, the District Court 
did not discuss the Government‟s contention that the 
recorded conversations were in furtherance of the indicted 
conspiracy.   Neither party challenges this on appeal.   
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satisfy Rule 807(a)(1).  Finally, he asserts that the District 
Court erred in imposing restitution without making specific 
findings regarding his ability to pay.  
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  
 
III. 
 
A. The Conversations between Leveto and Gonzalez 
 
Turner contends that the District Court erred in 
admitting the conversations between Leveto and the 
undercover IRS agent, Manuel Gonzalez, under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) because the Government 
failed to prove that a conspiracy existed between Turner 
and Leveto to recruit members to FAR. 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that 
a statement by a “party‟s coconspirator during and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy” is not hearsay if it is offered 
against that party.  For an out-of-court statement to be 
admissible under this Rule, the Government must prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that:  (1) a conspiracy 
existed; (2) the declarant and the party against whom the 
statement is offered were members of the conspiracy; (3) 
the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy; 
and (4) the statement was made in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.  United States v. Ellis, 156 F.3d 493, 496 (3d 
Cir. 1998).   To prove these elements, the Government may 
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rely on the co-conspirator‟s statements themselves, if they 
are corroborated by independent evidence.  Bourjaily v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987); United States v. 
Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1361 (3d Cir. 1991); see also 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).  Statements are admissible under 
this Rule “even if the basis for admission is a conspiracy 
different from the one charged.”  Ellis, 156 F.3d at 497. 
 
When a district court concludes that a conspiracy 
existed, we review the district court‟s findings as to the 
elements outlined above for clear error.  Ellis, 156 F.3d at 
496 (citing United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1081 
n.11 (3d Cir. 1990)).  “Clear error exists when giving all 
due deference to the opportunity of the trial judge to 
evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the 
evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction 
that [a] mistake has been committed.” Commerce Nat’l. 
Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 
432, 435 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000).       
 
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the 
District Court did not clearly err in determining that a 
conspiracy existed to impair the IRS‟s tax collection 
efforts by recruiting members to FAR, which assisted 
members in implementing Turner‟s fraudulent tax 
avoidance program.  The following independent evidence 
supports the District Court‟s decision.  First, there was a 
written agreement between Turner and Leveto to sell Tax 
Free!, and Tax Free! directed readers to contact FAR.  
This directive is not surprising since Turner benefited 
substantially if his readers joined his organization.  The 
membership fee in 1990 was $10,000.  As recruiting FAR 
members was an obvious purpose of the book, and a 
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benefit to Turner, it is a reasonable inference that Turner 
and Leveto would have also agreed that Leveto—a FAR 
member himself and the person interacting with Turner‟s 
potential clients—would encourage interested customers to 
join FAR.   
 
Second, Leveto met with Gonzalez several times 
after he sold Gonzalez the book.  One of the meetings 
occurred when Gonzalez appeared late and unannounced at 
Leveto‟s house.  Although Leveto and his family were 
preparing for bed, Leveto met with Gonzalez for almost an 
hour in Gonzalez‟s car.  It is reasonable to infer that 
Leveto, who had never met Gonzalez before he sold him 
Tax Free!, continued meeting with Gonzalez after he sold 
Gonzalez the book to recruit him to Turner‟s FAR.   
 
Third, Gonzalez received a letter from Turner stating 
that Leveto had submitted Gonzalez‟s name as a “qualified 
candidate” for FAR membership and enclosing a 
membership application.  This supports a finding that 
Leveto was screening and recommending potential 
members to Turner.     
 
Finally, Leveto‟s own statements provide ample 
evidence of a conspiracy.  For example, Leveto repeatedly 
insisted that Gonzalez attend a membership meeting with 
Turner to fully understand the program.  He assured 
Gonzalez that Turner would do phone consultations and 
provided Gonzalez with Turner‟s telephone and fax 
numbers.  He informed Gonzalez that when two of his 
friends joined FAR that he, his friends, and Turner met to 
discuss how best to implement the program for his friends.  
And he informed Gonzalez that when Gonzalez contacted 
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him, he alerted Turner.  Each of these statements suggests 
that Leveto was not simply selling books but was actively 
recruiting members to FAR.     
 
Based on this evidence, we do not find the District 
Court‟s determination that a conspiracy existed to be 
clearly erroneous.  We will therefore not disturb the 
District Court‟s ruling that the recorded conversations were 
admissible.   
 
B. The Foreign Bank Documents 
 
1. Authentication 
 
 Turner contends that the District Court erred in 
admitting Leveto‟s foreign bank documents because the 
Government cannot prove their authenticity.   We review a 
district court‟s ruling that evidence was properly 
authenticated for abuse of discretion.   United States v. 
McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 328 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires the 
authentication of evidence before a district court may 
admit it.  The standard for authenticating evidence is 
“slight,” McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 
916, 928 (3d Cir. 1985), and may be satisfied by “evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the 
proponent claims it is.”  Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).  This Court 
does not require conclusive proof of a document‟s 
authenticity, but merely a prima facie showing of some 
competent evidence to support authentication.  
McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 928; United States v. Goichman, 
547 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  “Once a 
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prima facie case is made, the evidence goes to the jury and 
it is the jury who will ultimately determine the authenticity 
of the evidence, not the court.”  Goichman, 547 F.2d at 
784. 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b) provides examples 
of appropriate methods of authentication, including 
reliance on “[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal 
patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item.”  
Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4).  This list is not exhaustive, 
however, and it is clear that the Government may 
authenticate documents with other types of circumstantial 
evidence, including the circumstances surrounding the 
documents‟ discovery.  See McGlory, 968 F.2d at 329 
(considering that notes were found in trash outside of 
defendant‟s residence as evidence of authenticity); 
McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 929 (considering that documents 
were produced in response to a discovery request as 
evidence of authenticity) (citing Burgess v. Premier Corp., 
727 F.2d 826, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that exhibits 
found in defendant‟s warehouse were adequately 
authenticated simply by their being found there)).  We 
have also considered whether the information included in 
the evidence is widely known.  See McQueeney, 779 F.2d 
at 929-30 (concluding that small number of people who 
knew the information in the evidence supported finding of 
authenticity).   
 
The Government easily met its slight burden here.  
First, the appearance of the documents support their 
authentication:  the documents have the official appearance 
of bank records.  They bear the insignia of foreign banks, 
see, e.g., A. 1735, A. 1784, and contain the type of 
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transaction data typically present on bank records, see, e.g., 
A. 1727, A. 1785.  The documents are also internally 
consistent in their appearance.  Compare A. 1689 with A. 
1693.   
 
Second, the contents of the documents provide 
evidence of their authenticity.  The documents were 
addressed to Leveto‟s home and business addresses and 
post office box.  See, e.g., A. 1718, A. 1722.  Several of 
the documents were responsive to faxes that Leveto sent.  
And the Government reconciled many of the foreign bank 
documents with domestic bank records—the authenticity 
of which Turner does not challenge.  Moreover, the bank 
records included information that was not widely-known, 
including Leveto‟s personal account information and 
aliases.   
 
Third, the IRS seized the records from Leveto‟s home 
and office and safes inside Leveto‟s office, which strongly 
supports a finding of authenticity because it is likely that 
Leveto would have stored his bank records there, and his 
possession of the documents indicates his belief that they 
were important.   
 
Finally, although we agree with Turner that it is the 
Government‟s burden to prove authentication, Turner has 
not suggested any reason why the Court should doubt the 
authenticity of the documents.  This only bolsters our 
conclusion that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the documents were properly 
authenticated.  As such, we will affirm the District Court‟s 
holding that the documents were properly authenticated.    
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2. Admissibility 
 
Turner argues that the District Court erred in 
admitting the foreign bank documents under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 807 because the Government did not prove 
that the documents had exceptional guarantees of 
trustworthiness.
2
   We review for clear error a district 
court‟s finding that evidence was sufficiently trustworthy 
to be admissible under Rule 807.  United States v. Wright, 
363 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
The residual hearsay exception permits a district 
court to admit an out-of-court statement not covered by 
Rules 803 or 804 if the court determines that:  
 
(1) the statement has equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of  
trustworthiness; (2) it is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (3) it 
is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other 
evidence that the proponent can 
obtain through reasonable efforts; 
and (4) admitting it will best serve 
the purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 807.  The exception is “„to be used only 
rarely, and in exceptional circumstances‟ and „appl[ies] 
                                              
2
 Turner concedes that the foreign bank documents satisfy 
Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(2)-(4).   
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only when certain exceptional guarantees of 
trustworthiness exist and when high degrees of 
probativeness and necessity are present.‟”  Wright, 363 
F.3d at 245 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 
347 (3d Cir. 1978)).  The determination of whether a 
document is sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under 
Rule 807 is a highly fact-specific inquiry.  Id. at 246.  In 
making this determination, the district court may not rely 
exclusively on corroborating evidence.  See Bailey, 581 
F.2d at 349. 
 
 In United States v. Pelullo, we analyzed whether 
bank records should be admissible under the residual 
earsay exception and noted that in general, bank records 
“provide circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
because the banks and their customers rely on their 
accuracy in the course of their business.”  964 F.2d 193, 
202 (3d Cir. 1992).
3
  Other courts of appeals have similarly 
concluded.  See United States v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 376 
(5th Cir. 2001) (admitting foreign bank records under the 
residual hearsay exception), abrogated on other grounds 
by Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005); United 
States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1127 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(same); Karme v. Comm’r, 673 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (same).   
 
                                              
3
 We ultimately excluded the evidence, however, because 
unlike here, the Government did not notify the defendant that 
it was introducing the evidence under the residual exception, 
and the district court did not make explicit findings as to the 
trustworthiness of the documents.  Id. at 204. 
 
 16 
 
 The District Court concluded that the same evidence 
that supported the foreign bank documents‟ authenticity 
was also sufficient to support the documents‟ 
trustworthiness, and therefore, admissibility under Rule 
807.  Turner contends that this was error for three reasons.  
First, relying on Bohler-Uddeholm America, Inc. v. 
Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79 (3d Cir. 2001), Turner 
asserts that it is “impossible” to admit the records under 
Rule 807 because the declarants of the bank documents are 
unknown.  Second, Turner argues that Karme and Wilson 
are distinguishable because in those cases, the sources of 
the documents were banks—in contrast to here, where the 
IRS seized the documents from Leveto‟s residence and 
business.  Third, Turner maintains that the District Court 
improperly relied only on corroborating evidence in 
admitting the documents.  
 
 We find that Turner‟s arguments lack merit and that 
the District Court did not clearly err in concluding that the 
documents possessed sufficient indicia of trustworthiness.  
First, contrary to Turner‟s assertion, the Government is not 
required to identify the declarant of the foreign bank 
documents in order for the documents to be admissible 
under Rule 807.  See Wilson, 249 F.3d at 375-76 
(admitting bank records under the residual hearsay 
exception with no mention of declarant); Nivica, 887 F.2d 
at 1127 (same); Karme, 673 F.2d at 1064-65 (same); see 
also Fed. R. Evid. 807.  Bohler-Uddeholm does not suggest 
otherwise.  In Bohler-Uddeholm, this Court affirmed the 
district court‟s ruling admitting the affidavit of a person 
who died before trial under Rule 807.  We explained that 
the factors that the district court analyzed in admitting the 
affidavit, including whether the declarant was known and 
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whether the statements were based on personal 
observation, were sufficient for this Court to uphold the 
district court‟s order.  Bohler-Uddeholm, 247 F.3d at 113.  
We did not hold, however, that these factors were 
necessary for hearsay evidence to be admissible under 
Rule 807, and we decline to require those factors here 
where many of the documents were computer-generated.     
 
 Second, as discussed supra, that the IRS seized the 
documents from Leveto‟s residence, office, and safes 
within his office, weighs in favor of the reliability of the 
documents—not against it.  Turner does not dispute that 
the IRS seized the documents from Leveto.  He does not 
identify any break in the chain of custody of the 
documents.  And he does not suggest any reasons why 
Leveto would have been storing false bank documents that 
implicated him in tax fraud.   
 
 Third, the District Court did not improperly rely only 
on corroborating evidence in admitting the bank records.  
As detailed above, the District Court relied on: (1) the 
appearance of the records, including their internal 
consistency; (2) the contents of the records; and (3) the 
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the records.  
Those grounds are entirely legitimate. 
 
 Finally, it bears repeating that Turner has not 
identified any document that he claims is a forgery or in 
any way inaccurate.  Accordingly, we will not disturb the 
ruling of the District Court.    
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C. Restitution 
 
Turner argues that the District Court erred in 
imposing restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663 because it 
required him to pay the full amount of the Government‟s 
losses without making specific findings regarding his 
ability to pay.  For the first time on appeal, the 
Government urges, however, that 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), applies.  
Under the MVRA, a sentencing court is required to order a 
defendant to pay the full amount of a victim‟s losses 
without considering the defendant‟s economic 
circumstances.  Id. § 3664(f)(1)(A).  Thus, under the 
MVRA, the Government contends that the District Court‟s 
restitution award was proper.  We review the legality of a 
restitution order de novo and review specific awards for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 
355 (3d Cir. 1995).   
 
As an initial matter, we will address Turner‟s 
contention that the Government waived the argument that 
the MVRA applied by not urging it before the District 
Court.  While it is a general rule that arguments raised for 
the first time on appeal are waived, the waiver principle “is 
only a rule of practice and may be relaxed whenever the 
public interest or justice so warrants.”  Tri-M Group, LLC 
v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
citations omitted).  Indeed, we have been reluctant to apply 
the waiver doctrine if the issue raised is solely one of law 
and no additional fact-finding is necessary.  Id. at 417-18.  
Here, whether the MVRA applies is a pure question of law.  
Neither party disputes the District Court‟s factual findings 
or suggests that further development of the record would 
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assist the resolution of this matter.  Moreover, we have not 
previously addressed whether the MVRA applies to 18 
U.S.C. § 371 offenses, and therefore, we find it particularly 
appropriate to reach the issue.     
 
 The MVRA provides for mandatory restitution to the 
victims of certain identified offenses, including offenses 
“against property under this title, or under section 416(a) 
of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 856(a)), 
including any offense committed by fraud or deceit.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1).  MVRA does not define “offenses 
against property.”  We have held that this term includes 
offenses involving money.  See United States v. Diaz, 245 
F.3d 294, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (imposing restitution under 
the MVRA for money laundering offense).     
 
 The MVRA defines “victim” as “a person directly 
and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of 
an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, 
in the case of an offense that involves as an element a 
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any 
person directly harmed by the defendant‟s criminal 
conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern.”  18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2).  The MVRA‟s 
enforcement provision expressly identifies the government 
as an eligible victim by providing:  “[i]n any case in which 
the United States is a victim, the court shall ensure that all 
other victims receive full restitution before the United 
States receives any restitution.”  Id. § 3664(i); see also 
Diaz, 245 F.3d at 312 (finding that United States 
Department of Education is a victim under MVRA).  
District courts ordering restitution under the MVRA must 
“order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each 
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victim‟s losses as determined by the court and without 
consideration of the economic circumstances of the 
defendant.”  18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). 
 
 Turner asserts that he did not commit an “offense 
against property” in conspiring to defraud the IRS of 
Leveto‟s tax dollars, arguing that Leveto‟s unpaid taxes are 
not the IRS‟s property because the IRS never possessed the 
money.  Contrary to Turner‟s assertion, his success in 
keeping Leveto‟s tax dollars out of the hands of the IRS 
does not make the taxes Leveto owes to the IRS any less 
the IRS‟s property.  Depriving a person of something that 
lawfully belongs to him does not render whatever is owed 
not his property.  Certainly, obligations owed to 
someone—for instance, their accounts receivable—are 
“assets” and therefore property.  See Pasquantino v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 349, 355-356 (2005) (stating that the right 
to collect previously uncollected excise taxes is “„property‟ 
in [a Government‟s] hands”, and that “[t]his right is an 
entitlement to collect money . . . , the possession of which 
is „something of value‟ to the Government. . . .”).  As such, 
we conclude that Turner‟s conspiracy to defraud the IRS of 
its property, Leveto‟s tax dollars, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371, is an “offense against property under this title [title 
18],” and consequently covered by the MVRA.  Our 
conclusion is consistent with the position of other courts 
that have decided this issue.  See United States v. Meredith, 
685 F.3d 814, 827 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying MVRA to 
conspiracy to defraud the IRS in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371); United States v. Campbell, No. 1:07-cr-239-5, 
2009 WL 4885231, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2009) 
(same).   
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 Applying the MVRA, we find that the District Court 
did not err in ordering Turner to pay $408,043 in 
restitution to the Government.  As noted, the MVRA 
prohibited the District Court from considering Turner‟s 
economic circumstances in ordering restitution.  Moreover, 
the parties do not contend that the MVRA provides a 
different method for calculating the Government‟s tax loss 
than § 3663, and Turner does not contest that the District 
Court‟s award accurately reflects the Government‟s loss.  
As a result, we will affirm the District Court‟s $408,043 
restitution order. 
 
VI. 
 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s judgment of conviction.  In addition, we 
will affirm the District Court‟s order of restitution in the 
amount of $408,043. 
 
